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Note
Public School Access: The Constitutional Right of
Home-Schoolers to "Opt In" to Public Education
on a Part-Time Basis
David W. Fuller*
Annie Swanson's parents taught her at home.1 Their reasons
for doing so were primarily religious; they wanted to teach
their daughter Christian principles not included in the curricu-
lum at public schools.2 When Annie reached the seventh grade,
however, her parents decided their daughter might benefit
from attending the local public school on a part-time basis to
supplement the education she was receiving at home? The su-
perintendent granted the Swansons' request for access, and
Annie took two seventh-grade classes that year. She per-
formed well and caused no disruption to the school.
The following year, the Swansons encountered difficulties
when they tried to register Annie for several eighth-grade
classes.4 The superintendent who had given Annie permission
to attend selected seventh-grade classes had been replaced,
and the new superintendent referred the issue to the school
board. The board effectively excluded Annie from all partici-
pation by adopting a policy that required full-time attendance.5
Following failed attempts to negotiate, the Swansons sued the
school district in federal court, alleging the policy violated their
rights under state and federal statutory and constitutional
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1995,
St. Olaf College. The author wishes to thank Steffen N. Johnson for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1 See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 942 F. Supp. 511, 513 (W.D.
Okla. 1996), affd, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
2. See id. at 516-17.
3. See id. at 513.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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law.' The district court granted the school district's motion for
dismissal, converting it to a motion for summary judgment
against the Swansons7 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
Since the 1980s, the number of American parents choosing
to educate their children at home has risen dramatically. In
their compulsory school attendance laws, state legislatures
have facilitated this trend by recognizing home education as a
legitimate alternative to attending either public or private
educational institutions. Furthermore, state and federal courts
have upheld the right of parents to home-school, often declaring
unconstitutional laws that unduly burden this right.
As Annie Swanson's case illustrates, however, some home
educators would also like limited access to the public schools.
While these parents usually wish to continue primarily teach-
ing their children at home, they recognize that there are cer-
tain benefits that can only be gained in an institutional setting.
They have sought permission from local schools to enroll their
children in select classes like chemistry or in extracurricular
activities like football. While several states have statutes
guaranteeing public school access to home-schoolers, public
school officials have had mixed reactions in states that leave
the decision to the discretion of local school boards. When nego-
tiations have broken down, some frustrated home educators
have asked courts to fashion a legal remedy that would force
schools to accept their children on a part-time basis. So far,
most of these lawsuits have been unsuccessful, but the ques-
tion of public school access for home-schoolers is not likely to go
away soon.9
6. See id. at 513-14.
7. See id. at 518.
8. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 703. To date, Swanson is the only federal
court of appeals case involving part-time public school access for home-
schoolers.
9. See Eugene C. Bjorklun, Home Schooled Students: Access to Public
School Extracurricular Activities, 109 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1996); Derwin
L. Webb, Home-Schools and Interscholastic Sports: Denying Participation Vio-
lates United States Constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection Rights,
26 J.L. & EDUC. 123 (1997); Lisa M. Lukasik, Comment, The Latest Home
Education Challenge: The Relationship Between Home-Schools and Public
Schools, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1913, 1915 (1996) ("Eighty-one percent of home edu-
cators feel that they need or want to enroll their children in extracurricular
events at public schools, and seventy-six percent of home educators would also
like to enroll their children 'part-time' in academic courses in public or private
schools.").
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This Note argues that courts should apply the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions in these cases, recognizing a right
to public school access as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Part I examines the status of public education as a generally
available benefit offered by every state and describes the con-
stitutional right of parents to direct the education of their own
children, exploring in particular the applicability of that right
in the home-schooling context. Further, Part I briefly outlines
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Part H applies this
doctrine to the question of public school access for home educa-
tors, concluding that public schools should abandon full-time
attendance requirements because they impose an undue bur-
den on the constitutional right to home-school.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
TO THE PUBLIC SCHOOL ACCESS DEBATE
Home-schoolers have historically been seen as cultural
separatists or dissenters who prefer to have minimal interac-
tion with "mainstream" Americans.10 It has thus come as
something of a surprise to many public educators that a growing
number of home-schooling families are now returning to the
schools, seeking permission to participate in selected classes or
extracurricular activities."
10. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOwARDs GOMORRAH 334
(1996) (referring to the home-schooling movement as "simply an effort to seek
sanctuary, to create small islands of decency and civility in the midst of a sub-
pagan culture"); WILLjAM M GORDON ET AL., THE LAW OF HOME SCHOOLING 2
(1994) (describing some groups of home-schoolers as "substantially isolated
from mainstream American educational values"); STEPHEN ARONs, COM-
PELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 191-94 (1986)
(describing many home educators as "maintain[ing] a world view and beliefs
at odds with majority culture"). For this reason, home-schoolers have some-
times felt they are held in disdain by public educators and others who feel
they represent the American mainstream. See ARONS, supra, at 191-94; see
also Swanson, 135 F.3d at 696 (noting that the new superintendent "made
some statements that Mrs. Swanson interpreted as criticism of Christian
home-schoolers").
11. See, e.g., All Schoolwork and No Play?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct.
20, 1997, at Cl; Home-Schoolers Want Public Access, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 1997, at Al, Home-Schoolers Rebuffed Sept. 18, 1997;
Home-School Rights Issue Splits Board, ALTOONA MIRROR (Altoona, Pa.),
Sept. 18, 1997.
From the perspective of some public educators, it must seem as if the
wayward Prodigal Son has finally decided to return home to his father. See
Luke 15:11-24 (New King James version) (parable describing how a son who
has left home early and squandered his inheritance on raucous and profligate
living "comes to his senses," returns home, and remorsefully begs for mercy
16011998]
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Home educators who have encountered official resistance
to their requests to opt into public education on a part-time
basis have occasionally challenged school districts in court."2
To date, the majority of legal attempts to coerce public schools
into allowing access have failed.'3 The legal arguments put
forward by home educators in access cases have been eclectic,'4
and such challenges would benefit from a more careful and sys-
tematic formulation like the unconstitutional conditions theory.
This approach recognizes that, while there is no clear right to
public education under the federal constitution, the govern-
ment severely (or gratuitously) burdens the ability of parents
to exercise their constitutional right to home-school by insist-
ing upon full-time attendance in order to participate in the
generally available benefit of public education.
A. THE NATURE AND LEGAL STATUS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AS
A GENERALLY AVAILABLE BENEFIT
The constitution of every state provides for a system of
public education.'5 Acting pursuant to their respective consti-
from his father-who, to the son's great surprise, has been eagerly awaiting
his return and throws a feast in his honor). Unlike the son in the parable,
however, access-seeking home-schoolers have not always been welcomed back
with open arms by public schools. See Swanson, 942 F. Supp. at 513.
12. See, e.g., Bradstreet v. Sobol, 650 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.YA.D. 1996); see
also Kaptein v. Conrad Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d 1311 (Mont. 1997) (denying re-
quest by private school student to participate in athletics at public school); cf
Kristina M. Knapcik, Home-Schooled Boy's Family Goes to Court Over Foot-
ball, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 1997.
13. See Bradstreet, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 404; Swanson, 942 F. Supp. at 518; cf.
Gayda Hollnagel, Judge Denies Home-Schooled Student's Football Request, LA
CROSSE TRIB., Aug. 20, 1997.
14. See, e.g., Swanson, 942 F. Supp. at 513-14 (setting forth causes of ac-
tion under five distinct legal theories: deprivation of a state constitutional
right to free public education, impairment of the federal constitutional right to
guide and direct the education of one's children, burden on religious free ex-
ercise under the First Amendment, violation of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, and violation of Due Process).
15. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, amended by ALA. CONST. amend. 111;
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIz. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 1; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. DC, § 2; CONN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CoNST. art.
VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2nd, § 3; KAN.
CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, preamble & § 1;
ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5,
§ 91; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1 & 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MISS.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 201 & 205; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art.
X, §§ 1, 2; NEB. CONST art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CoNST. pt.
[Vol. 82:15991602
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tutional mandates, legislatures in every state have established
public school regimes that share some structural commonal-
ties. State public education systems invariably delegate a de-
gree of authority to local school districts. 6 This authority typi-
cally rests with elected school boards, which exercise discretion
alongside superintendents and other district-level administrators.
These local officials make day-to-day as well as long-term op-
erational decisions, manage finances, and establish policies
concerning curricula, facilities, hiring, and other matters of
general school governance.' 7
Funding for public schools comes from a combination of local,
state, and federal tax sources.'" District-level financing typi-
cally comes from local property taxes, and may be supple-
mented by municipal or district-wide sales, use, or income
taxes.'9 State funds supplement these local funds to varying
degrees, furthering the dual purposes of eliminating local
budget shortfalls and minimizing the effects of income dispari-
ties between districts throughout the state. 0 School districts
must regularly demonstrate their financial need to state edu-
cation agencies in order to justify their budget requests.2' An-
nual budgets, usually based on the previous year's operating
expenses, are based on a combination of factors, including
teachers' salaries, facility costs, and per-pupil allotments.2
2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2; OHIO
CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1, 4; S.C. CONST. art. X, § m;
S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CoNsT. ch. II, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W.VA. CONST. art. X1I, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, §§ 2,
3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 9.
16. Cf. Guilbert C. Hentschke, Emerging Roles of School District Admin-
istrators: Implications for Planning, Budgeting, and Management, in PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: ISSUES IN BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 59-69 (John
Augenblick ed., 1985).
17. See id.
18. See KERN ALEXANDER & RICHARD G. SALMON, PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCE 115-30 (1995).
19. See id.
20. See Charles S. Benson, State Government Contributions to the Public
Schools, in PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 16, at 17 (describing the two main
purposes of state government contributions as "to distribute the state's money
directly in relation to need-to-spend and inversely with respect to local
wealth").
2L See ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 18, at 191-210.
22. See id. at 212-13.
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Funding structures for public education assume that most
students will attend school on a full-time basis.' This as-
sumption, however, does not mean that the cost of educating
each student is the same.24 Different kinds of students have
different needs that require varying levels of service and pro-
gramming u Some states take the resulting "per-pupil cost dif-
ferentials" into account through a budgeting technique known
as the "weighted pupil method."26 This accounting method assigns
relative cost factors to students based on their grade level and
whether they participate in special programs such as speech
therapy, English as a second language, vocational training, or
adult basic skills." In addition, school officials and experts
recognize that not all students attend the same program, or
even attend school at all, on a full-time basis.'
23. See id. at 213
24 See id. at 212-21.
25. See Richard H. Goodman, Providing Adequate Resources for Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools, in PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 16, at 36.
26. ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 18, at 213.
27. See id. at 213-20 (describing the weighted pupil method and illustrat-
ing how it works using "educational cost differentials" from Florida in 1992-
93).
28. See id. at 214. The official presumption of full-time attendance is a
formality that does not reflect the realities of public education today. Public
schools routinely make significant scheduling and other accommodations for
individuals or groups of students in many types of situations. Most of these
circumstances require administrative adjustments in several interdependent
areas: a change in scheduling necessitates relevant shifts in staffing and cur-
riculum, all of which may alter funding.
Sometimes scheduling flexibility on the part of public schools is pre-
scribed by statute. For example, Minnesota's Post-Secondary Enrollment Op-
tions (PSEO) program allows high school students to leave school regularly
during the day in order to attend classes at local colleges or universities, for
which they receive both public secondary school credit and prospective college
credit. See MINN. STAT. § 123.3514 (1996); Shuchi Anand et al., MYN: College
Head Start, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 25, 1997, at C2 (recounting suc-
cess of the PSEO program, in which registered students "have a variety of op-
tions for adjusting their courses into their schedules ... [and] can choose be-
tween fifll-time or part-time enrollment," and mentioning that the program
allows home-schooled students to take advantage of free enrollment at par-
ticipating colleges). Moreover, public schools in many states also make special
scheduling accommodations for students wishing to receive religious instruc-
tion during the school day. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 120.101 subd. 9(3) (1996)
(allowing up to three hours per week of off-site religious instruction); see also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding "release time" policies
during the school day for part-time religious instruction in the face of an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge); Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1357 (10th
Cir. 1981) (same).
Schools must also deal creatively with students experiencing physical, emo-
[Vol. 82:15991604
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B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HoME-SCHooL
Although the nature of the government benefit at issue is
important in unconstitutional conditions arguments, a pre-
liminary question is whether there is a constitutional right at
stake at all. In public school access cases, it is therefore es-
sential to examine the right of parents to make the most fun-
damental educational decisions about their own children. If
there is no such right in the federal constitution, the unconsti-
tutional conditions analysis fails before it can begin. Fortu-
nately for home-schoolers, the federal constitution guarantees
them the right to direct the upbringing and education of their
children.
Parents nationwide elect to home-school their children for
a wide variety of reasons. Often the motivation is entirely re-
ligious, stemming from biblical convictions about holy living
and the need to bring theological beliefs to bear on all aspects
of life.29 Other families choose home education for completely
secular reasons, such as disenchantment with either the qual-
ity of instruction or the influences of peer interaction at public
schools, or out of a general desire for parents and children to
spend more time together." Still others base their decision on
tional, or social difficulties. Students who become ill during the day may go home
early. Disruptive students are often temporarily removed by means of detention or
suspension. See, eg., MINN. STAT. § 127.41 (1996) (establishing grounds and pro-
cedure for removing students from the classroom setting); Ud § 127.29 (1996)
(allowing dismissal of students who willfully violate school rules, disrupt the
educational environment, or endanger other); id. § 127.28 (mandatory expul-
sion for at least one year for any student caught with a firearm in school).
Others may be sent to alternative public schools specifically designed to better
meet their heightened educational needs. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 1240.46
(1996) (establishing "area learning centers" that provide vocational and other
training to troubled students). Such alternative learning centers often employ
individual tutoring and flexible scheduling, and may permit part-time atten-
dance to allow for outside employment. Pregnant girls or unwed mothers also
sometimes take advantage of these part-time opportunities, working or at-
tending to their children as they earn a graduate equivalency degree (GED).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 126.235 (1996).
29. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, THE RIGHT CHOICE: HOmE-
SCHOOLING 101-15, 171-99 (1995) (quoting numerous bible passages that
highlight the duty of parents to train their children).
30. See id. at 21-91 (discussing failures of the public school system);
HowARD & SusAN RICHMAN, THE THREE R's AT HoME (1988) (describing two
parents' reasons for home-schooling their children); MARIO PAGNONI, THE
COMPLETE HOME EDUCATOR: A COMPREHENsIVE GUIDE TO MODERN HOME-
TEACHING (1984); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 10, at 2-3 (grouping
home-schoolers into two general categories according to their motivation as
"Pedagogues" or "Ideologues").
1998] .1605
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such factors as nonreligious philosophical or moral disagree-
ment with the content of mainstream education or a general
distaste for bourgeois society.3 Perhaps most often the choice
of home education stems from a combination of these or similar
reasons.
The home education movement has grown rapidly in
America over the past fifteen years,32 yet it is by no means a
new phenomenon in this country. Many prominent figures in
national history were trained at home, for example.33 Moreover,
although many home educators have only a high-school degree,
home-schooling tends to be highly effective in achieving many
of the basic goals of education, including socialization.34 De-
31 See Joan Armon, Is Home-Schooling for Everyone?, in SCHOOLING AT
HOME: KIDS, PARENTS, AND LEARNING 218-24 (Anne Pederson & Peggy
O'Mara eds., 1990).
32. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 (reporting that the number of
children educated at home may have increased as much as 25-fold since the
1970s). See generally Alma C. Henderson, The Home Schooling Movement:
Parents Take Control of Educating Their Children, 1991 SURVEY AM. LAW 985
(1991) (noting the dramatic rise in the number of home-schooling families
during the 1980s).
Recent cultural developments suggest that the home-schooling movement
is unlikely to lose its momentum. For example, many students and parents
are increasingly alarmed by dangerous conditions at public schools. See Chris
Graves et al., Gangs, Violence on the Rise in U.S. Schools, STAR TRJB.
(Minneapolis), Apr. 13, 1998, at A5. Also, continual improvements in home
computer technology have enhanced the ability of many families to access a
broad range of information and educational services from home. See GREG
KEARSLEY, TRAINING FOR TOMORROW: DISTRIBUTED LEARNING THROUGH
COMPUTER AND COMMUNIcATIONS TECHNOLOGY 1-2, 11 (1985) (predicting a
"new era in education and training" in which learning is "fundamentally inde-
pendent of time and space", and pointing out the increasing ease of home edu-
cation as a result of computer technology). In Minnesota, the Minneapolis
public school system has in fact instituted a publicly funded internet educa-
tion opportunity that has been most heavily used by home-schoolers. It is of-
ficially intended for children in grades 3-8 "who may be homebound due to an
illness ... or just children whose needs are not presently being met." See Cyber
Village Academy, Information (visited March 31, 1998) <http'J/www.cva.kl2.
mn.us/information.htm>.
33. See KLICKA, supra note 29, at 153-64 (noting that among other
prominent figures, "[alt least ten" presidents were taught largely at home); see
also Lukasik, supra note 9, at 1917 & n.31 (including George Patton, Agatha
Christie, and Andrew Carnegie in a list of famous figures who were home-
schooled).
34. See KLICKA, supra note 29, at 131-41 (pointing to high standardized
test scores and college acceptance rates as evidence that home-schooled stu-
dents "excel ... well above average"); id. at 141-44 (refuting the argument
that home-schooled children suffer in development of social skills); Lukasik,
supra note 9, at 1918 n.33 (citing studies showing consistently dramatic aca-
demic success by home-schooled pupils).
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spite home education's traditional roots and broadly docu-
mented record of success, however, home-schoolers have
struggled to convince courts and legislatures that home-
schooling is a legitimate pursuit.
1. The Liberty Interest of Parents in Rearing Their Own
Children
The authority of parents to direct the education of their
children was well established at common law.35 But as a fed-
eral constitutional matter, the right of parents to make the
most basic decisions about their children's upbringing was first
clearly recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska.36 Meyer involved a
state statute that prohibited the use of any language other
than English in public elementary schools.17 Employing Four-
teenth Amendment substantive due process analysis,3 the
Court found illegitimate the statute's attempt to impose cul-
tural and social homogeneity on children39 and therefore struck
35. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *450-53. Today, many
states continue to recognize that, in principle, education is primarily a paren-
tal responsibility. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 120.101 subd. 1 (1996); N.H. STAT.
cl. 193-A History (1997) (stating that "it is the primary right and obligation
of a parent to choose the appropriate education alternative for a child under
his care and supervision," and allowing home education as an "alternative to
attendance at a public or private school" that is "more individualized than in-
struction normally provided in the classroom setting").
36. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
37. See id. at 397.
38. See id. at 399. "Substantive due process" refers to a mode of inter-
preting the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
such that the clauses guarantee not only certain procedural safeguards before
citizens may be deprived of "life, liberty, or property," but also establish cer-
tain liberties which may not be taken away regardless of the process afforded
to citizens. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 369-93 (5th ed. 1995).
The concept of "substantive due process" employed in Meyer, Pierce, and
Farrington has been widely criticized. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA 36-37 (1990) (decrying the Due Process Clause's "capacity to ac-
commodate judicial constitution-making"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 14-20 (1980) (recounting use of the Due Process Clause "to 'supporte
[the Court's] sporadic ventures into across-the-board substantive review of
legislative action," and describing the phrase "substantive due process" as "a
contradiction in terms-sort of like 'pastel green redness'"); ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 24 (1997) (calling substantive due process
analysis "[mly favorite example of a departure from text"); id. at 39 (stating
that the Due Process Clause is "textually incapable of containing" new liber-
ties).
39. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02. The Court at one point unfavorably
compared the Nebraska policy to the radical social collectivism envisioned by
19981 1607
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it down as an unconstitutional infringement on the "fundamental
rights" of parents.'
In two cases decided soon after Meyer, the Court reaf-
firmed and amplified the right of parents to guide and direct
their children's education. The clearest statement of this
principle came in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,4 in which the
Court examined an Oregon statute mandating public school at-
tendance by all children.42 In response to a challenge brought
by private schools, the Court struck down the statute because
it "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control."43 III Farrington v. Tokushige," the Court
further extended the authority of parents over educational de-
cisions concerning their children by invalidating state regula-
tions that excessively interfered with the selection of teachers
and curricula at private schools.4" Together, Meyer, Pierce, and
Farrington" established the basic constitutional right of par-
Plato's Republic. See id.
40. Id. at 402. The Court in the 1920s did not employ "fundamental
rights" terminology. The phrase, however, is commonly used today to describe
liberties which arise under a substantive due process analysis, and the Court
in the 1970s did describe this liberty as a "fundamental right." See Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Lukasik, supra note 9, at 1926 n.99.
41. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
42. See id. at 530.
43. Id. at 534-35. In a frequently quoted passage, the Court proceeded to
declare:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nur-
ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 535.
44. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
45. See id. at 298. At issue in Farrington was the constitutionality of a
Hawaii statute requiring all foreign language schools and instructors in those
schools to obtain a state permit, and to demonstrate their commitment to
democratic principles and knowledge of American government and culture.
See id. at 290-98. The Court found that by imposing government control over
the "intimate and essential details" of private schools, the state was denying
parents their right to "reasonable choice and discretion in respect of teachers,
curriculum and text-books." Id. at 298. Farrington seems to have rested on a
broadened version of the liberty interest established in Meyer and Pierce,
which the Court now described as the "general doctrine touching rights guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to owners, parents and children in re-
spect of attendance upon schools." Id.
46. Of the three cases, Pierce is by far the most widely cited. This Note
will sometimes refer to the constitutional right of parents to direct the up-
1608 [Vol. 82:1599
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ents to rear their own children as they see fit, particularly in
the context of schooling decisions. 4
Today, courts consistently acknowledge the right of par-
ents to direct the upbringing and education of their own chil-
dren.' Although the Pierce right was originally recognized
bringing and education of their children simply as "the Pierce right."
47. Despite widespread recognition of the Pierce right, several factors
have created confusion over its scope, and over the standard of review it
should trigger. First, many believe the right of parents to guide and direct
the upbringing and education of their children has a dubious basis in the text
of the Constitution, see supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting the con-
troversial nature of the concept of substantive due process), and courts may
be understandably hesitant to take Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington especially
seriously for this reason.
Second, the language of "reasonableness" plays a prominent role in Pierce.
See 268 U.S. at 534-35. Some courts see this language as indicating only
"rational basis" review. See, e.g., J.B. v. Washington County, 905 F. Supp.
979, 991 (D. Utah 1995) (stating that "not every interference with a funda-
mental right will trigger strict scrutiny" such as where there is no
"affirmative impediment to the exercise of that right"); Null v. Board of Educ.
of County of Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 937, 939-40 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (indicating
that home-schooling is not a "specific fundamental right" but is only "a gen-
eral liberty interest subject to reasonable state regulation"). Others, however,
apply a considerably more stringent standard. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. O'Donnell,
702 F. Supp. 516, 519-21 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (noting that the Pierce right coupled
with First Amendment concerns dictate a higher standard of review).
Third, beyond the traditional educational context, the Pierce right is po-
tentially relevant in cases involving such issues as abortion, see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 853, and contraception, see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). Courts sometimes seem to
employ different modes of analysis depending on the factual setting in which
they must apply Pierce.
Finally, although Meyer and Pierce forcefully articulate the theory of pa-
rental rights, the Court in both cases was also careful to insist that states re-
tain the right to impose reasonable regulations on schools. See Meyer, 262
U.S. at 402; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 ("There is
no doubt as to the power of a State... to impose reasonable regulations for
the control and duration of basic education."). It is somewhat difficult to rec-
oncile these statements with the holding of Farrington, in which the right of
private schools to be free from government intrusion was held to be of para-
mount importance. See Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298 (characterizing the pro-
visions at issue as going "beyond mere regulation"). Nevertheless, it seems
clear that according to Supreme Court case law, states today retain signifi-
cant authority to establish standards and requirements for all types of educa-
tion so long as they stop short of micromanaging private schools or dictating
their most basic self-definitional decisions. See, e.g., Peterson v. Minidoka
County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351, 1358 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
state's "high interest in education limits" the "liberty of parents to determine
the education of their children"). Not surprisingly, this internal tension has
led to contention over the point at which state regulations become
"unreasonable."
48. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the Pierce right. See,
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through substantive due process analysis, a growing number of
courts and commentators view it as essentially a First Amend-
ment liberty.49
2. The Law of Home Education
Courts today generally recognize the constitutional right to
choose home education. Wisconsin v. Yoder 0 is the only Su-
preme Court case directly to address a situation resembling
home-schooling. Yoder involved a challenge to a Wisconsin
statute that required parents to send their children to school
until the age of sixteen. The plaintiffs, Old Order Amish par-
ents who disdained "worldly influences,"52 felt that the school-
ing requirement would "substantially interfer[e] with the relig-
ious development" of their children.53 The Court granted them
an exemption from the law,54 but only because it was fully con-
vinced that the parents' objections to formal schooling past age
sixteen were completely "rooted in religious belief."55 Yoder did
e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 951 (1992) (referring
with approval to the Pierce right); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
882 (1990) (citing cases that combine the Free Exercise Clause with "other
constitutional protections, such as... the right of parents, acknowledged in
Pierce ... to direct the education of their children").
49. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(characterizing Pierce as involving First Amendment claims); Henry v. Betit,
323 F. Supp. 418, 422 n.6 (D. Alaska 1971) (stating that Meyer and Pierce
were "decided in the context of a parent's quasi-first amendment right" to di-
rect children's upbringing); In re Falk, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785, 790-91 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1981) (mem.); see also ARONS, supra note 10, at 205-208 (arguing that the
First Amendment should protect belief formation, and lamenting the Supreme
Court's "failure to address the First Amendment consequences of government
control of the value content of schooling"); BOR, supra note 48, at 113
(regretting that Pierce and Meyer are methodologically suspect but noting that
they "at least reflected the first amendment"); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educat-
ing Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1012-19 (1996)
(articulating a broad theory of "parental educative speech" that protects the
right of parents to impart their values to their children directly and through
schools and teachers as their agents); cf Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
176 (1976) (assuming that the First Amendment freedom of association in-
cludes the right of parents to send their children to a school that professes
belief in racial segregation, but holding that the school may not actually prac-
tice discrimination).
50. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51. See id. at 207. The parents in Yoder had been fined five dollars for
their noncompliance with the mandatory school attendance law. See id. at 208.
52. Id. at 217.
53. Id. at 218.
54. See id. at 234-35.
55. Id. at 215. The Court relied heavily on studies and expert testimony
by sociologists in reaching its conclusion that the Amish's pervasively commu-
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not rest primarily on the substantive due process right set
forth in Pierce, but rather relied on the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment." The Court found that the plaintiffs'
children received an adequate alternative education outside
the formal school setting57 and that, in spite of their separa-
tism, the Old Order Amish were able to flourish as a "highly
successful social unit within our society."58
With Yoder as controlling precedent, courts have acknowl-
edged the constitutional right to home-school most consistently
where the parents' motivation is religious. 9 Many courts im-
pose no religious restriction, recognizing that the right should
be afforded equally to parents who choose home education for
secular reasons.' In addition to outright criminal prohibitions
nal "mode of life" and their strong religious faith were "inseparable and inter-
dependent." Id. This close connection between lifestyle and religious belief
was critical to the Yoder decision, which in fact contrasted the Amish with
parents who might object to formal schooling for mere "philosophical and per-
sonal" reasons, or who simply reject "contemporary secular values accepted by
the majority" as Thoreau did in his day. Id. at 215-16. Educational decisions
based solely on "personal preference" or "subjective evaluation" would not
have been protected under the First Amendment, according to the Yoder ma-
jority. Id; cf. Peterson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351,
1357 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that acts need not be "mandated" by church
teaching to be "rooted in religious belief under the Yoder standard).
56. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207, 219-29. Yoder does reaffirm Pierce, how-
ever, characterizing it "as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the relig-
ious upbringing of their children." Id. at 233. According to the Court in Yo-
der, the "additional obligations" for which parents are responsible to prepare
their children under Pierce, "must be read to include the inculcation of moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." Id. Thus,
while it is not the main ground for decision, the Pierce right strengthens the
Free Exercise claim in Yoder. It is also significant that Yoder describes the
parental liberty interest from Pierce as a "fundamental interest." Id. at 233.
57. See id. at 221-25. The Court found that while not attending school,
Old Order Amish children were by no means idle. Rather, they were occupy-
ing themselves productively, working with their families, and acquiring useful
life skills in the process. See id. at 222, 224, 229.
58. Id. at 222.
59. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993).
60. See, e.g., In re Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 598, 600 (Mass. 1987)
(declaring home-schooling to be a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and declaring that compulsory attendance laws were designed to
ensure "that all children shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in
any particular way' (quoting Commonwealth v. Roberts, 34 N.E. 402, 403
(Mass. 1893))); Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646 (N.C. 1985) (refusing to
construe North Carolina's compulsory attendance laws to prohibit home-
schooling in an effort to avoid "serious constitutional questions").
On the other hand, there have always been some courts that refuse to
recognize a fundamental right to home-school on any basis, regardless of mo-
tivation. See, e.g., Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442, 1456-58 (E.D.
1998] 1611
1612 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1599
like the statute violated in Yoder, courts have often indicated
that some state efforts to regulate home education impose ex-
cessive burdens on the constitutional right to home-school."
Courts have never had the chance to iron out all the wrinkles
in the case law because by the late 1980s states stopped at-
tempting to prevent parents from exercising their right to
home-school. Today, thirty-one states (and the District of Co-
lumbia) statutorily guarantee the right of parents to educate
their children at home.'
Mich- 1989) (upholding a criminal truancy prosecution against home-schoolers
and indicating that the Pierce right is not fundamental apart from religious
motivation); Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452, 460-63 (N.D. III.
1974) (dismissing a challenge against a law that prohibited home-schooling).
61. See, e.g., Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(mem.) (striking down "educational equivalency" requirements on vagueness
grounds); Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (striking down
"substantial equivalency" requirements), rev'd, 802 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1986)
(reversing without opinion); cf Iowa v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Iowa
1987); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985) (same for "essentially
equivalent" requirements); Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983)
(same for "private schools").
Here, too, there have been some courts that uphold equivalency or
teacher certification requirements despite the burden they place on the right
to home-school. See, e.g., State v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627, 630 (Ohio 1987);
State v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Neb. 1981); State v.
Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 893-95 (N.D. 1980).
62. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (West Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-15-501 to -507 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-33-104(2)(1) to 104.5 (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-402 (Michie
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.02(4) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690
(Michie 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 298-9(a)(5) (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 299.1 & 299A.1 to .10 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:236
& 236.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-
A(3)(A)(3) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031 (Vernon Supp.
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102(e) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.070
(1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-A (1997); N.M. STAT ANN. § 22-12-2
(Michie 1993); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 115C-563 to -565 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 15-34.1-06 to -12 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3321.04(A) (Anderson Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.030(3) (1995); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327(d) (West 1992); R.I. GEN LAWS § 15-19-1 (Supp.
1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-65-40 & -45 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-3001(C) & 49-6-3050 (Michie Supp. 1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102(1)(b)(ii) (Michie 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-254 & -254.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 28A.225.101(l)(b) (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Michie
Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(1)(a), (d)(5) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997);
WYO. STAT. § 21-4-102(b) (Michie 1997). Many of these laws are simply
amendments to mandatory school attendance statutes allowing home-
schooling to count as the "educational equivalent" of institutional learning.
Courts also sometimes infer such exceptions where they are not explicitly
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Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of state legislation, a
recent Ninth Circuit decision based on both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Pierce right demonstrates the continued vital-
ity in the courts of the constitutional right to home-school in
the courts. Peterson v. Minidoka County School District No.
33161 involved a public school principal who was terminated on
the basis of his announcement that he was contemplating
withdrawal of his own children from the public school system
in order to enable his wife to instruct them at home. Upon
hearing of the principal's rumored plans, several concerned
parents called the school to voice their criticism, and many
staff members said they felt "betrayed" or "disappointed" by
the alarming news.M Despite these morale problems, however,
the court held that the principal "was exercising a constitu-
tional right and that accommodation of uninformed and preju-
diced persons was not a compelling state interest outweighing
that exercise."65 Because the school board had illegitimately
conditioned the principal's retention of his job on his agree-
ment not to home-school his children, the court remanded the
case to award full backpay, damages for "mental anguish,
stated in the statute. See, e.g., Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d
432,443-44 (Tex. 1994).
63. 118 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1997).
64. Id at 1354. In addition to loyalty concerns, the Superintendent con-
cluded that Mr. Peterson would no longer be able to function in his position as
principal once his family began the project of home education, because it
would require so much time and effort from the parents. See id. at 1354-55.
The Petersons had twelve children, eight of whom were to be home-schooled.
See id. at 1354.
65. Id. at 1357. The Petersons were Mormons, who wished to teach their
children at home so that "in every course of study they would learn that God
as the creator of all things was related to the subject at hand." Id. at 1356.
As the court noted:
The belief in God as the creator... is among the most basic and most
pervasive of tenets in the biblical religious that have entered into our
civilization. To relate that belief to education is a type of exercise of
religion. Creation by God implies purpose and design in what God
has created. From the perspective of the believer God is not another
category to be considered along with other forces, but a living pres-
ence guiding the teacher and the student.
Id. The Petersons' religious motives led the court to apply strict scrutiny to
the school board's decision, but this was not because of a finding that Mormon
beliefs "mandated" home-schooling. Rather, it was sufficient that Mr. Peter-
son's claim be "based on his personal sense of what his religion requires." Id.
at 1356-57. Furthermore, Mr. Peterson's wife claimed to have an additional
"motivation that seems secular: her love for children." Id. at 1356.
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humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional distress," and at-
torney's fees.66
3. The Law of Public School Access
Wehrle v. Plummer,67 the first case to address public school
access, held that nonpublic school students could not be denied
admission to a "manual training school" maintained by the
public school system. Like most cases raising the issue of a
right to opt into public education on a part-time basis, Wehrle
did not involve home-schoolers at all, but rather students from
private schools. The right of access in that case was based on a
provision of the Pennsylvania School Code stating that nonat-
tendance at a public school did not provide grounds for exclu-
sion from the program.
The question of public school access did not arise again
until the 1970s. Since then, thirteen cases have raised varia-
tions of the part-time opt-in issue.68 In most of the modern
66. Id. at 1360. The only work Mr. Peterson was able to find subsequent
to his dismissal by the school district was as a truck driver.
67. 21 Pa. D. 182 (1911), affd sub nom., Commonwealth ex rel. Wehrle v.
School Dist. of Altoona, 241 Pa. 224, 88 A. 481 (1913).
68. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-1, 942 F. Supp. 511
(W.D. Okla. 1996), aff/d, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998); Parents' Ass'n of P.S.
16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235, 1242 (2d Cir. 1986); Denis J. O'Connell High
Sch. v. Virginia High Sch. League, 581 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1978); Valencia v.
Blue Hen Conference, 476 F. Supp. 809 (1979); Kaptein v. Conrad Sch. Dist.,
931 P.2d 1311 (Mont. 1997); Bradstreet v. Sobol, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 486 (Sup.
1995); McNatt v. Frazier Sch. Dist., 1995 WL 568380 (W.D. Pa. March 10,
1995); Davis v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 3 Mass. L.
Rep. 375 (Mass. Super. 1995); Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.
2d 151 (Mich. 1984); Thomas v. Allegany County Bd. of Educ., 443 A.2d 622
(Md. App. 1982); Cook v. Griffin, 364 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1975); School Dist. of
Hartington v. Nebraska Bd. of Educ., 195 N.W.2d 161 (1972); School Dist. of
Traverse City v. Attorney General, 185 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1971).
Several cases have also addressed the "opt-out issue, which raises simi-
lar questions of scheduling flexibility, curricular choice, administrative control
over general school fimctions, and parental authority. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy
and Safer Prod., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that children who found
a highly lewd and sexually explicit AIDS awareness presentation morally of-
fensive could not be excused from the event); Fleischfresser v. Directors of
Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a supplemental read-
ing program did not burden the religious beliefs of children whose parents felt
they were being "indoctrinated" contrary to their faith); Mozert v. Hawkins,
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that parents who had religious objec-
tions to the reading assignments in a literature course could not withdraw
their children from the class); Grove v. Mead, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985)
(same). Some states have reacted against these decisions by enacting statutes
that explicitly grant to parents who object to curricular content the right to
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cases, access-seeking plaintiffs lose to defendant school dis-
tricts.69 Three out of the four cases that have involved home-
schoolers have concluded that there is no right to attend
classes or participate in extracurricular activities on a part-
time basis." Generally, however, courts seem to be somewhat
more sympathetic to requests involving extracurricular activi-
ties than to requests to attend classes on a part-time basis.
7 1
Beyond these minimal observations, however, it is difficult
to identify any distinct trend. In the two modern cases grant-
ing a right of access, the plaintiffs employed remarkably diver-
gent theories in efforts to gain part-time access to different
programs.72 To date, the most success has come where state
statutory schemes grant access to nonpublic school students,
either explicitly or under traditional interpretation.
Today, thirteen states have enacted statutes that specifi-
cally guarantee some type of public school access to students
educated primarily at home.73 In these states, home-schoolers
arrange for reasonable alternative instruction. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §
126.699 (1996). The court in Swanson found the opt-out cases to parallel the
question raised there. "We see no difference of constitutional dimension be-
tween picking and choosing one class your child will not attend, and picking
and choosing three, four, or five classes your child will not attend." Swanson,
135 F.3d at 700.
69. The cases that plaintiffs have lost: Thomas, Bradstreet, McNatt, Qui-
nones, Swanson, Kaptein, Hartington, Traverse City, Denis J. O'Connell High
School, Valencia, Cook (citations appear supra note 68).
70. Accessed was denied in Swanson, McNatt, and Bradstreet.
71. Compare, e.g., Davis, 1995 WL 808968 at *3, with Swanson, 135 F.3d
at 701-02.
72. See Snyder, 365 N.W.2d 151 (Mich- 1984) (focusing on statute guaran-
teeing public education to "all children"); Davis, 3 Mass. L. Rep. 375 (Mass.
Super. 1995) (striking down restrictive rule that operated to prevent home-
schooler from participating in athletics because it violated Equal Protection
analysis and failed to pass even rational basis review).
73. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802.01 (Supp. 1995) (allowing home-
schooled students to participate in interscholastic activities at public schools);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-33-104.5(6) (West 1995) (allowing home-schooled
students to participate in interscholastic and extracurricular activities at
public schools); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.425 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing home-
schooled students to participate in curricular, extracurricular, and interscho-
lastic activities at public schools); IDAHO CODE § 33-203 (allowing home-
schooled and other nonpublic school students to participate in nonacademic
activities at public schools); ILL. COMPILED STAT. ANN. 5/10-20.24 (stating
that nonpublic school students may request to enroll part-time in public
schools); IOWA CODE ANN. § 281-31.5(299A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996)
(allowing home-schooled and other nonpublic school students to participate in
curricular or extracurricular activities at public schools); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20-A, § 5021 (West 1993) (allowing home-schooled students to participate
in academic, cocurricular, extracurricular, and special education activities at
1998] 1615
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may enjoy some of the privileges of public education despite
their inability to enroll full-time. It is conceivable that, as
happened with home-schooling generally during the late 1980s,
the remaining states may adopt provisions that obviate the
need to litigate opt-in issues. 4 In the absence of such statutory
arrangements, however, home-schooling parents who wish to
enroll their children in public school on a part-time basis
usually must make a special request to either the local princi-
pal or the school board of the district in which they reside. As
long as this situation continues, lawsuits are likely to arise
from time to time when reasonable requests for access are de-
nied.
C. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
Outside this area of law, courts have consistently prohib-
ited government from forcing citizens to choose between the re-
ceipt of a benefit and the exercise of a right guaranteed by the
constitution. In other words, once government has created a
generally available public benefit, it may not condition enjoy-
ment of that benefit in such a way as to impinge upon the abil-
ity of citizens to exercise a constitutional right.75 There are
many government programs that the government was under no
public schools); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193A:2(ID) (Supp. 1995) (stating that
school districts are to "work with parents upon request" to meet legal subject
requirements); N.M. REV. STAT. ANN. 195:7 & 195:8 (allowing school districts
to receive funds from the state for home-schoolers to whom they provide
services); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-34.1-06 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (establishing a
procedure for home-schools to submit to school districts a list of extracurricu-
lar activities and notice of intent to participate); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.460
(1995) (forcing school districts to allow home-school students access to public
school interscholastic activities); UTAH STATE BD. OF EDUC. REG. R277-438-4
(allowing home-school students to participate in extracurricular activities);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-253-13:1(H) (providing state funding to school districts
which allow home-schooled students to enroll part-time for "core subjects");
WASH. COMMON SCH. PROVISIONS 28A.150.350 (school districts must permit
enrollment of and provide ancillary services for home-schooled students en-
rolled part-time); WYO. HIGH SCH. AcTIVITIms Assoc. RULES 3.1.3, 6.2.0, 6.4
(allowing home-schooled students to play on participating schools' sports
teams).
74. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. At present this outcome
seems unlikely. Several state legislatures have considered but rejected public
school access statutes that would have benefited home educators.
75. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230
(1987); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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initial obligation to establish. Once it does so, however, it still
may not impose conditions on the receipt of that benefit that, in
the absence of the benefit, it could not have imposed directly.76
Conditions attached to generally available benefit pack-
ages may be unduly burdensomeP in either of two ways. First,
they may be so severe that they prevent altogether the exercise
of the constitutional right at issue.8 Second, conditions may be
unreasonably burdensome if they are gratuitous, that is, where
it would be virtually costless for the government to waive them
and they impose high replacement costs on the citizens they
burden.79
76. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem:
Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1015 (1991) ("A
common understanding of constitutional law is that although the government
has no obligation (absent exceptional circumstances) to subsidize the exercise
of constitutional rights, it is forbidden to penalize the exercise of those
rights."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access" for Re-
ligious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 653, 664-65 (1996)
("Government may not condition one legal right, benefit, or privilege on the
abandonment of another legal right, benefit, or privilege, the relinquishment
of which the government would not have authority to command directly.");
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (1989) (stating that the doctrine prevents government from "grant[ing] a
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right,
even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether"); William W.
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1968) (stating that "whatever an ex-
press constitutional provision forbids government to do directly it equally
forbids government to do indirectly").
77. Courts are not in full agreement as to the precise technical standard
of scrutiny to accord the constitutional right to home-school. See supra note
47 (indicating variances in understanding and application of Pierce). A de-
tailed exploration of standard of review issues is beyond the scope of this
Note. One possibility would be to employ the "undue burden" standard articu-
lated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 893 (1992). See Jon S. Lerner,
Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 62 U.
Cm. L. REV. 363, 364 (1995).
78. See Paulsen, supra note 76, at 664-66.
79. See id. at 665-67; see also, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(holding unconstitutional an amendment-to the Colorado constitution that ef-
fectively prevented homosexuals from participating fully in the political proc-
ess, and finding that the provision did not pass even rational basis review be-
cause there could be no explanation for the law apart from "sheer animus").
Utter disabling of the exercise of a constitutional right on the one hand,
and utter gratuitousness of the condition on the other hand, are only the two
most extreme forms of the unconstitutional conditions argument. In between
these poles lies a broad middle ground occupied by many lesser (and many
less gratuitous) conditions that still impose substantial burdens on constitu-
tional rights. For example, a regulation may be found to be so economically
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There are practical limits to the unconstitutional condi-
tions argument, however. Sometimes, even conditions that do
infringe on constitutional rights are inherently necessary to
the provision of a government benefit."0 When this is the case,
courts will allow the condition to stand despite the infringe-
ment.' Additionally, conditions that would otherwise be un-
constitutional may be justified by a compelling government in-
terest.2
Where courts strike down unconstitutional conditions,
they generally attempt to salvage every remaining provision of
the government program or benefit that poses no constitutional
defect. 3 This piecemeal treatment of statutory schemes re-
quires a determination that the defective portion is "severable"
from the rest of the program or benefit.4 Supreme Court
precedent has established a strong presumption in favor of
severability in statutory interpretation.85 Generally, courts will
deem a statutory provision severable if, in its absence, the re-
coercive that it effectively prohibits any meaningful choice.
Many of these intermediate conditions will also be struck down as uncon-
stitutionally severe, though in a literal sense they may not completely bar ex-
ercise of a constitutional right, and though the comparison between replace-
ment costs to the burdened citizen and costs to the government of lifting the
burden may be closer. This Note will focus only on the two extremes, for pur-
poses of illustrating how an unconstitutional conditions analysis might func-
tion in public school access cases generally. Actual arguments made in court
will of course depend on the specific facts of each case.
80. See Paulsen, supra note 76, at 665 (noting that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine cannot apply when the condition is "inseparable
from... the nature of the right or benefit itself'). The Supreme Court found
this to be the case in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), where Congress
was allowed to condition funding of a family planning program on agreement
not to provide abortion counseling because such counseling was deemed alien
to the very nature of the program itself.
81. See Paulsen, supra note 76, at 665.
82. See McConnell, supra note 76, at 1015 (mentioning "exceptional cir-
cumstances" and "strong, perhaps compelling, justification" as necessary to
overcome unconstitutional conditions argument).
83. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
84. See Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987).
85. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976) (per curiam) ("Unless
it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid
part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." (citations omit-
ted)). In addition to the statutory interpretation setting, the notion of a gen-
eral presumption of severability appears in other contexts as well. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2434-35 (1994) (treating witness
testimony as "severable" for hearsay exclusion purposes by defining a
"statement" as a single remark rather than an extended narrative).
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mainder of the law can be reasonably carried out without vio-
lating the overall purpose of the statute. 6
II. APPLYING THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
ARGUMENT TO "OPT-IN" CASES: DENIAL OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL ACCESS AS AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE
RIGHT TO CHOOSE HOME EDUCATION
The majority of public educators believe they are able to
provide an educational product at least equivalent in quality to
that which can be obtained through home instruction.87 Most
of the factors that make public education a positive good for
full-time students would seem to apply equally to students
seeking to attend on a part-time basis. Home-schoolers who
seek access to the public schools are beginning to agree, and
are seeing gaps in their own instructional abilities in some re-
spects."8 Their opt-in requests thus acknowledge that there is
some positive value in the public educational enterprise. 9
The ultimate motivation of public educators ought to be to
serve the public good by ensuring that the product they offer is
of the highest quality, and by providing that product to as
many children as would benefit from it in accordance with the
constitutional mandates of their states. To the extent that this
is their motivation, one would expect public educators to be
thrilled to learn that many home-schoolers have finally come to
see the real benefits public schools have to offer them, and are
now requesting the services of public schools instead of con-
tinuing to instruct their children in isolation from the cultural
and educational mainstream.90
At a time when many have called into doubt the very vi-
ability of public education,9' home-schoolers-traditionally per-
86. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)(holding that an unconstitutional restriction on the ability of radio stations to
express their views using their own fimds was separate from a governmental
interest in controlling expression supported by its own funds).
87. See, e.g., GORDONETAL., supra note 10, at 5.
88. Perhaps not unlike the Prodigal Son who had come to the end of his
resources and found himself enjoying his freedom less than he had antici-
pated. See supra note 11.
89. As in the parable, these parents have returned "home" repentant and
prepared to beg for mercy, in search of food and shelter they could not provide
for themselves. See supra note 11.
90. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting widespread percep-
tion of home-schoolers as separatists).
91. Outright attacks on public education-sometimes by well-organized
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ceived as rivals of the public schools-have tacitly agreed that
there is much the public schools have to offer. The public edu-
cation establishment might therefore be expected to go to great
lengths to accommodate part-time access requests in any way
possible.92 But in many districts just the opposite has hap-
pened, and schools have been reluctant in the face of what
seem to be reasonable requests that actually affir the value of
public education.93
Probably the best solution, and one that has worked well
in several states already, is for the legislature to pass a statute
ensuring that public schools grant reasonable requests by
home-schoolers for part-time access to the public schools.
However, some state legislatures have considered such legisla-
tion but failed to enact it, often as a result of heavy lobbying ef-
forts by teachers' unions. In states without statutes assuring
home-schoolers they can have part-time access to the public
schools, courts will continue to be brought into the dispute
where negotiations between local school districts and home
educators break down. It is therefore critical for courts to
think clearly and systematically about the issues these cases
present.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine clearly applies to
the right to home-school, especially since the doctrine has be-
come so well established in First Amendment case law.94 Ab-
interest groups-are increasingly commonplace today. See, e.g., Proclamation
for the Separation of School and State, (visited Nov. 17, 1996)
<http'//www.sepschool.org/proclamationhtml> (asserting that, no matter how
good the instruction, a "Common School" system cannot address the "differing
hopes Americans hold for their children," and concluding that "in a pluralistic
society, we must undo government compulsion in school funding and atten-
dance"). See generally CHARLES J. SYKES, DUMBING DowN OUR KIDS: WHY
AMERICA'S CHILDREN FEEL GOOD ABOUT THEMSELVES BUT CAN'T READ,
WRI E, OR ADD (1995).
92. Like the patiently waiting father in the parable, public schools should
rush to embrace penitent home-schoolers, and figure out some way to "throw
a feast" in their honor. See supra note 11.
93. The schools offer various versions of the "administrative inconven-
ience" excuse to justify denying part-time enrollment requests. These argu-
ments often ring hollow in the face of the facts. See infra notes 106-123 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that denying requests for part-time access
is gratuitous). Ultimately, it could be that the public education establishment
feels that so long as home-schoolers seek to use public school services on a
part-time basis, they are not yet truly "penitent"-and the schools are holding
out until repentance is complete.
94. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that the Pierce right
today is widely conceived as an aspect of freedom of expression under the
First Amendment); McConnell, supra note 76, at 1015 ("he most extensive
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sent compelling justification, states may not condition the en-
joyment of any generally available benefit-including public
education-on relinquishment of the right to home-school. Be-
cause public education is a benefit intended for all citizens, it
therefore may not be offered in such a way as to burden home
education unduly.
A. THE SEVERABILITY OF FULL-TIME ATTENDANCE POLICIES
Public school access cases are essentially challenges to a
single aspect of public education policy: full-time attendance
requirements.95 Therefore, a systematic approach to these
cases must begin with a preliminary inquiry into whether
those requirements are severable. If full-time attendance
policies are deemed to be unnecessary to the provision of the
overall benefit package of public education, then they are po-
tentially dispensable, and courts may scrutinize them sepa-
rately in order to determine whether they burden the constitu-
tional right to home-school unduly. 6
It seems evident that public schools would still be able
provide an adequate education if they allowed some students to
attend on a flexible or part-time basis. In fact, many circum-
stances already exist in which schools must accommodate un-
usual or irregular student scheduling issues. Sophisticated
modern budgeting methods and management techniques provide
adequate means of taking these adjustments into account.97
Perhaps the strongest evidence that full-time attendance rules
are not essential to the provision of public education is the sub-
stantial number of states with statutes that already mandate
the allowance of part-time access to classes or extracurricular
activities for home-schoolers.98 Therefore, courts should find
these attendance policies fully severable from the overall
benefit package on the basis of the inherently flexible nature of
body of doctrine bearing on [the unconstitutional conditions doctrine] has
arisen under the free speech clause."); see also, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 273-77 (1981) (holding that once a university has created an "open fo-
rum," it may not prevent religious groups from using it on an equal basis).
Peterson, a case involving home-schooling, was decided on an unconstitutional
conditions-type theory. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., 135 F.3d 694, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting the Guthrie
School Board's challenged full-time attendance policy).
96. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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the educational enterprise. To the extent that full-time atten-
dance requirements stand in the way of granting part-time ac-
cess to home-schoolers who feel their constitutional rights are
burdened, courts should examine them on their own merits,
separately from the overall scheme of public education.
B. THE SEVERITY OF THE BURDEN ON HOME EDUCATION
In public school access cases, the burden caused by full-
time attendance requirements will be considered unconstitu-
tionally severe if courts find that, with respect to a particular
plaintiff, home education cannot continue so long as the policy
is in place. School administrators are sure to point out that
home education has taken place successfully in the past, even
in localities with school districts that strictly prohibit part-time
attendance by unenrolled students. In particular, they may
contend, the remarkable increase in the number of home-
schooling families over the past fifteen years demonstrates that
the inability of home educators to opt into the benefits of public
education must not really be a debilitating handicap.
This significant argument is not dispositive, however, be-
cause it does not take into consideration the varying skill levels
of parents who wish to home-school their children. In fact,
many parents who would prefer to educate their children at
home are effectively prevented from doing so because of the re-
fusal of local school districts to allow part-time attendance.
For all practical purposes, these parents are unable to exercise
their constitutional right to choose home-schooling because the
only feasible way for them to meet statutory equivalency re-
quirements is to have their children participate in advanced
math, chemistry, or some other course that is already offered
by the local public school but that the parents themselves lack
the wherewithal to provide." These parents would be able to
home-school but for the refusal of their local school district to
99. See Lukasik, supra note 9, at 1960 n.307. The severity of the burden
on the right to home-school would of course increase dramatically in situa-
tions where state statutes require that the education provided by parents at
home be "equivalent" to that which they could have obtained through the
public school system. To date, parents completely prevented from home-
schooling by such statutes have not appeared in public school access cases,
because those cases have been initiated only by people who have already been
home-schooling.
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allow part-time attendance at critical courses that would round
out their child's educational experience.'0
Thus, at least in situations where gaps in instructional
abilities prevent parents from being able to home-school with-
out access to at least some upper-level courses at public
schools, the burden imposed on home educators by full-time at-
tendance requirements is severe."'1 If courts take the constitu-
tional right to elect home education seriously, they should insist
that school districts grant part-time access to home-schoolers
under such circumstances.
An obvious policy objection arises at this point. Considering
the foregoing argument about home-schooling parents who are
unable to teach their children adequately in certain areas of
the curriculum, it may occur to many to ask why such parents
should be allowed to home-school at all. Perhaps more surpris-
ing is the fact that these parents, knowing they lack expertise
with respect to important curricular areas, would even want to
teach their children at home. It may even be argued that, by
refusing to send their children to either public or private
school, such parents are harming their children through depri-
vation or "educational neglect.""2
A balanced response to this objection must acknowledge
that there are some families for whom home-schooling would
be an unwise choice, and for whom a decision to home-school
would work to the detriment of children and parents alike.
Many parents lack the time, skills or resources to do an ade-
quate job of teaching their children at home. Others claim they
100. Consider, for example, the parent who is knowledgeable in the hu-
manities and social sciences but less skilled at teaching secondary-level math
and science. With sufficient time and resources, this parent could either edu-
cate herself or hire someone to assist her with high school math and science
classes, and thereby provide an adequate home education for her children. By
requiring home educators to have a bachelor's degree, some states have in ef-
fect mandated this problem by law. See, e.g., Crites v. Smith, 826 S.W.2d 459(1991).
More likely, though, she would simply be unable to home-school at all
without access to particular classes at the local public school. In this scenario,
a school district refusing to grant access to home-schoolers would effectively
deprive this family of the ability to obtain a home education at all. Such dep-
rivation may be good or bad, depending on one's policy preferences and the
facts of particular cases. Clearly, where state legislatures have imposed
equivalency or certification requirements, there is a realization that some
families will thereby be prevented from home-schooling.
10L See McConnell, supra note 76, at 1003, 1030.
102. See, e.g., Carroll v. Wright, No. 97-CA56, 1997 WL 691468 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 7, 1997)
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are "home-schoolers" but really use the label as a cover for
outright laziness-or even abuse-that would not be possible to
the same extent if their children regularly attended an educa-
tional institution. 3 As to this latter type of parent, it seems
clear that the constitutional right to home-school should be
overridden by the compelling state interest in the well-being of
children.
But as to parents who simply lack sufficient time, skills, or
resources to home-school effectively, courts should take a more
measured approach. Presumably, most such parents-
particularly those who have too little time-will recognize their
own inability to home-school and forgo it in light of their family
situation.'" Those others, however, who do decide to home-
school in spite of their shortcomings will have made a genuine
mistake that results in some degree of harm to their own chil-
dren. ' 5 These parents may or may not ever become aware of
this harm.
The importance of this problem should not be minimized.
However, many factors complicate the situation and work to-
gether to indicate that it is probably best to allow parents the
freedom to make some mistakes with home education rather
than to extinguish altogether their right to home-school at even
the slightest sign of educational harm to children. First, at-
tempts at home-schooling are often short-lived.'0 6 Where par-
ents decide to experiment with teaching their children at home,
only to abandon the effort a short time later, the harm done to
the children is probably minimal.
Second, as the very existence of the home-schooling move-
ment illustrates, Americans have widely divergent views about
what is really important in education. Moreover, it is important to
recall that many people who decide to home-school are primarily
motivated not by educational or curricular considerations but
103. See, e.g., Matter of Devone, 356 S.E.2d 389 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
104. This is particularly true since most parents want their children to re-
ceive a good education. See Gilles, supra note 49, at 1003 (setting forth policy
arguments in favor of a robust theory of "parental educative speech" rights,
including the notion of "parental ideals").
105. The amount of "harm" depends, of course, on the degree to which the
education that was given up in favor of home-schooling would have been su-
perior to the home education actually received. In some cases, the differences
would be negligible even though the parents may suffer from significant gaps
in their own teaching abilities.
106. See Lukasik, supra note 9, at 1913 n.3.
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rather by concerns over issues such as socialization."7 These
basic differences of opinion would clearly affect beliefs about
what should count as educational harm, and would even lead
to varying conclusions as to the relative importance of educa-
tional harm as compared to other values such as religious
training or family bonding. Liberal political theory cautions
against vesting in any one individual or institution too much
power to impose on the populace-at-large its views concerning
such fundamental matters."8
Finally, allowing part-time access would actually minimize
the possible risks of educational harm associated with the
home-schooling movement. Granting opt-in requests would
remove incentives for parents who teach their children at home
to exaggerate their own skills and resources. Public schools that
take the all-or-nothing approach force parents to choose between
full-time enrollment on the one hand, and total nonparticipa-
tion in public education on the other. If home-schoolers must
"do it all," those whose desire to home-school is strong enough
will find ways to convince themselves and others that they are
capable of doing so, even if this is not entirely true."0 9 Thus,
full-time attendance policies may unwittingly discourage par-
ents who wish to home-school from being completely forthright
about their own shortcomings as teachers in order to avoid the
conclusion that they are basically unfit to home-school.
A more flexible approach would convert this danger into an
asset, since gaps in the instructional abilities of parents would
no longer threaten to incapacitate them from home-schooling
altogether but rather would act as an indicator that supple-
mental help is appropriate in those areas. This would benefit
home-schooling parents and their children, and would also fur-
ther the interests of society and the public education estab-
lishment in promoting effective education generally. There-
107. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
108. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-33; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIB-
ERALISM 134-35 (1993) (describing political liberalism as a system that
"allow[s] for a plurality of reasonable though opposing competitive doctrines
each with its own conception of the good"); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 335-37 (1988) (describing modern liberalism
as an attempt to "enable those who espouse widely different and incompatible
conceptions of the good life for human beings to live together peaceably within
the same society").
109. To say that full-time attendance requirements may abet dishonesty in
some cases is not to imply that the typical home-educator would succumb to
this temptation.
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fore, to the extent that the home education movement may
raise the possibility of educational harm to children,"' public
school access could serve to remedy this problem.
C. ArTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY THE DENIAL OF ACCESS
The foregoing discussion yields the conclusion that, in
some circumstances, full-time requirements may represent
burdens on home-schoolers so severe that courts should impose
exemptions or strike them down as unconstitutional because
they effectively prevent some parents from being able to home-
school their children. But a burden of this severity exists only
when parents lack the skills or resources necessary to provide
adequate or "equivalent" education to their children at home
and therefore need access to public school classes in order to
home-school at all. Even apart from these extreme cases, how-
ever, denying part-time access requests may be unduly bur-
densome to the constitutional right to home-school in another
way: it may be so unreasonable for schools to deny access to
home-schoolers that courts should strike down full-time require-
ments in all cases.
Full-time attendance policies often impose purely gratui-
tous burdens on the right to home-school. The policies are gra-
tuitous if full-time attendance policies place a burden on home-
schoolers that is entirely out of proportion to the government's
need to retain the policies. One way courts might determine
this would be to compare the costs public schools would incur
by waiving full-time requirements with the "replacement" costs
to home-schoolers-the costs of obtaining the currently un-
available benefit on their own.
The principal justification school districts offer when deny-
ing home-schoolers permission to opt into classes or extracur-
ricular activities is that of administrative inconvenience.'
110. If the past serves as any indicator, this would be very rare. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
111. See Lukasik, supra note 9, at 1967-69 (cataloguing the "numerous
practical and administrative problems" created by granting access requests).
To be fair to the schools, it is worth recalling that in many instances they are
struggling for their very survival. Subject to a barrage of constant criticism in
the daily papers, faced with increasing violence, laziness, and a general lack of
respect and discipline among pupils, and often badly strapped for fimds, ad-
ministrators and teachers alike are caught in the middle of a destructive cul-
tural war. Too often, the greatest casualty of that war is educational quality
itself (thus ultimately causing the students to suffer), as public schools strive
to continue providing a quality educational product while satisfying their
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While this rationale falls far short of a compelling government
interest,"' it does represent a genuine concern on the part of
public educators. Schools claim that by allowing unenrolled
students to attend classes on a part-time basis they may en-
counter the need to readjust their schedules or hire additional
instructors."' Stretching these justifications further, some
commentators have even made the argument that part-time
students would linger on school premises, requiring educa-
tional institutions to provide them with costly supervision-
essentially reducing schools to "child care" facilities.114 These
adaptations would require financial and other resources that
would be diverted from full-time students.
In fact, however, public school access for home-schoolers
would not be overly difficult or costly to provide. There already
exists in every state a ready-made institutional system de-
signed specifically to deliver the benefit of public education to
all children residing within the state."5 This benefit is typi-
cally mandated by the state constitution, and is intended for all
citizens." 6 Therefore, rather than seeking substantial altera-
tion of the status quo, home-schoolers requesting public school
access are simply asking for a subset of an existing benefit in
the context of a society with functioning institutions well
suited to grant it. Public schools already allow students to
participate in their programs on a flexible basis in many
situations," and their funding structures are often carefully
calibrated to take part-time attendance and other complicating
factors into account. '18
Courts should also recognize that because home-schoolers
are paying for a benefit they never receive, they currently rep-
resent a significant financial boon to most public education
systems. Home-schooling families continue to pay taxes at the
same rate as other citizens,"9 yet they have declined to take
various constituents to the best of their ability.
112. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
113. See Lukasik, supra note 9, at 1967-68.
114. See id.
115. See supra notes 15-28 and accompanying text.
116. It is even plausible to think of children who are educated at home as
remaining officially within the public educational system. North Dakota,
which currently imposes this understanding by statute, may be ahead of its
time. See N.D. CENT. CODE 15-34.1-06 to -11 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
117. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
119. The lack of remuneration to home-educators may not be unconstitu-
tional in and of itself. See supra note 79 (discussing the problem of interme-
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advantage of public education. Conversely, at least at the
statewide level, public school programs have access to more
money relative to their operating expenses because each home-
schooled child represents another taxpaying family that is
presently costing the schools nothing.
In arguing that allowing home-schoolers to opt in would be
fiscally burdensome for them, schools measure the potential
costs associated with part-time access against the complete
lack of costs represented by the current circumstance in which
home-schoolers are altogether absent from the public schools.
Instead, school boards and courts should consider access costs
in relation to the opposite alternative-the cost of having those
same students attend on a full-time basis.' This approach
would recognize the appropriate baseline for accurate financial
comparison. 2' Particularly in situations where home education
cannot occur at all without supplemental classroom instruction
in one or more important subject areas, it would cost schools
less, not more, to allow access. Although some immediate ad-
ministrative expenses would arise when home-schoolers attend
on a part-time basis, the costs of accommodating opt-in re-
quests would usually fall far short of the costs of providing full-
time education-which home-schoolers, like all other citizens,
are already free to demand at any time if they decide to quit
home education. Recognizing that home educators represent a
net monetary savings to public school systems, even when they
do participate in those systems on a limited basis,n belies the
diate burdens, including economic coercion). Generally there is no positive
governmental obligation to assist someone in the exercise of a constitutional
right. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); McConnell, supra note
76, at 1015. But see Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (recognizing an
exception to this rule in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to the as-
sistance of counsel for indigent defendants).
120. See, e.g., Public Funds for Pub. Sch. of N.J. v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514,
521 (3d Cir. 1979) (concurring opinion) ("[Plarents who send their sons and
daughters to nonpublic schools spare the state and its taxpayers the not in-
considerable expense of educating these children a cost that would otherwise
be incurred in fulfilling the state's obligation to provide a free primary and
secondary education").
121. See CASS SUNsTEiN, THE PARTIAL CoNsTrTUTION 68-92 (1993).
122. Many access-seeking home-schoolers have even indicated a willing-
ness to pay public schools to defray the administrative costs associated with
granting their requests for part-time attendance. While this gesture should
be unnecessary in light of the argument set forth here, it could further
strengthen the case for access, and highlights even more clearly the hollow-
ness of the reasons set forth to justify denying home-schoolers the right to opt
into public schools.
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argument that it is too costly for schools to accommodate re-
quests for access.
In comparison, the costs to home-schoolers who have been
denied permission to enroll in classes or extracurricular activi-
ties on a part-time basis may be great. For example, with ad-
vanced secondary school classes of the sort that typically appeal to
home-schoolers, there are basically two types of replacement
costs. First, parents currently unable to teach an advanced
course would be forced either to hire a tutor or to educate
themselves sufficiently to be able to teach the material them-
selves. In terms of both time and money, both options would
represent a substantial drain on home-schooling families-
particularly in comparison with the nominal cost to public
schools of allowing one additional student to attend a large
class taught by an instructor already trained in the subject
matter. Second, there may be equipment and facilities costs
for home-schoolers to bear if they wish to provide their children
with educational experiences qualitatively comparable to those
enjoyed by public schools. It would be difficult to teach ad-
vanced chemistry, for example, without expensive laboratory
equipment. While purchasing such equipment would probably
require significant expenditures by home-schoolers, it would
cost public schools relatively little incrementally because of the
greater potential for long-term usage, greater number of users,
and already-existing facilities." Refusals by public educators
to include home-schoolers who wish to take classes, join team
sports, or play in musical groups therefore appear to be unjus-
tified and highly gratuitous.
123. Both types of replacement costs-those associated with training for
the home-schooling parent, and those associated with the purchase of essen-
tial equipment-are also present in the case of extracurricular activities.
Schools with football teams, for example, typically have fields, protective
equipment, and trained coaches. Home-schooled students who wish to play
football but are denied access to the local public school team, on the other
hand, would not only need to assemble a sufficient number of fellow stu-
dents-perhaps other home-schoolers-to form a team, but they would also
need to locate a capable coach, equipment, and playing field. This would all
require substantial expenditures of time, energy, and money that could be
saved if home-schoolers were allowed to participate in the team at the local
public school. Parallel observations could be made about other athletic ac-
tivities like swimming or baseball, musical organizations like orchestra or
marching band, and other extracurricular activities. In most of these cases, it
is hardly even worth asking who would bear the greater costs.
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CONCLUSION
In states that lack statutory schemes guaranteeing home-
schoolers part-time access to public education, many local school
districts will continue to deny opt-in requests." Courts should
begin employing unconstitutional conditions analysis when
considering the question of whether home-schoolers have the
right to attend classes and participate in extracurricular ac-
tivities at public schools on a part-time basis. Under Pierce,
the First Amendment guarantees parents the right to direct
the upbringing and education of their children, and this clearly
includes the right to home-school. In order to preserve this
important parental freedom fully, courts should inquire
whether full-time attendance requirements place a severe or
gratuitous burden on the right to home-school.
Because full-time attendance policies are not integrally
related to the benefit of public education in such a way that the
state could not offer the benefit without the requirements, they
are severable and may be considered (and, if found to be un-
constitutional, struck down) on their own, leaving the remain-
der of the public education scheme intact. When home educat-
ing parents lack skills in important curricular areas, these
policies impose a severely burdensome condition on the consti-
tutional right to home-school by effectively undermining home
education as a viable alternative for them. Even when parents
are not lacking in teaching skills, however, full-time atten-
dance policies are gratuitous: they are not justified by the in-
ordinate costs they impose on access-seeking home educators
generally-costs out of all proportion to the costs public schools
would bear as a result of becoming more flexible. Therefore it
is not acceptable for school districts to prevent home-schoolers
from attending classes or participating in extracurricular ac-
tivities on a part-time basis, and courts should strike down
full-time attendance policies because they impose an unconsti-
tutional condition on the right of parents to instruct their chil-
dren at home.
124. Unfortunately, there is no guaranteed way to change the hearts of
resistant school administrators in order to make them more like the enthusi-
astic and welcoming father in the Prodigal Son story. See supra note 11.
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